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What	Italy’s	political	crisis	told	us	about	populism	in
Europe
The	political	crisis	in	Italy	that	emerged	after	Italian	President	Sergio	Mattarella	vetoed	Giuseppe
Conte’s	choice	of	finance	minister	quickly	gave	way	to	a	compromise.	But	what	did	the	affair	tell	us
about	populist	politics	in	Italy	and	Europe?	Ben	Margulies	writes	that	while	Mattarella	got	his	way	in
the	end,	his	actions	risked	bringing	about	the	very	thing	he	was	trying	to	prevent	–	an	Italian	exit	from
the	euro.
Sergio	Mattarella	with	the	new	Italian	government	on	1	June,	Credit:	Presidenza	della	Repubblica	(Public	Domain)
Europe’s	leaders	and	thinkers	long	feared	the	catastrophe	that	might	ensue	if	Italy	inaugurated	a	populist
government.	Then	they	feared	the	catastrophe	that	might	ensue	if	Italy	didn’t.
To	recap:	On	4	March,	Italy	held	a	general	election.	Two	populist	parties,	the	radical-right	populist	Lega	and	the
vaguely	centrist	Movimento	Cinque	Stelle	(Five-Stars	Movement,	or	M5S),	secured	approximately	half	the	vote.
Although	the	Lega	was	allied	to	other	right-wing	parties	during	the	election	campaign	(including	Silvio	Berlusconi’s),	it
and	the	Five	Star	Movement	formed	a	coalition	agreement	and	proposed	a	compromise	prime	minister,	a	law
professor	named	Giuseppe	Conte.	The	coalition	agreement	promised	a	flatter	income-tax	system,	expanded	income
support	for	the	unemployed,	tougher	policies	against	undocumented	immigration	and	the	renegotiation	of	European
fiscal	treaties.	On	23	May,	Sergio	Mattarella,	the	president	of	the	Republic,	formally	charged	Conte	with	installing	a
government.
Four	days	later,	Conte	resigned,	after	Mattarella	rejected	his	choice	for	role	of	finance	and	economy	minister,	Paolo
Savona,	because	Savona	is	vocally	opposed	to	the	euro.	Under	the	Italian	Constitution	(Article	92),	“The	President	of
the	Republic	appoints	the	President	of	the	Council	of	Ministers	and,	on	his	proposal,	the	Ministers,”	so	Mattarella’s
action	was	both	lawful	and	not	unprecedented.	In	previous	cases,	the	premier-designate	had	just	moved	the
offending	minister,	which	is	what	the	Lega	and	M5S	ended	up	doing	later	in	the	week.	But	for	a	few	days,	Lega	and
the	M5S	refused	to	back	down;	Conte	quit	as	premier-designate,	leaving	Mattarella	to	propose	a	former	IMF
functionary,	Carlo	Cottarelli	as	an	interim	premier	pending	new	elections.
On	31	May,	the	M5S	sounded	a	more	conciliatory	note,	indicating	that	it	might	move	Savona	to	a	different	portfolio
after	all.	And	that	is	what	happened;	Savona	was	moved	to	European	affairs,	and	Mattarella	named	Conte	premier.
So	what	does	this	all	mean?	What	were	Italy’s	leaders	thinking?	And	what	does	this	tell	us	about	wider	trends	in
European	politics?
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How	populism	mediates	the	conflict
Well,	let’s	start	with	that	oft-repeated	word,	populism.	A	populist	believes	that	“society	[is]	ultimately	separated	into
two	homogeneous	and	antagonistic	groups,	‘the	pure	people’	and	‘the	corrupt	elite’,	and	…	argues	that	politics
should	be	an	expression	of	the	volonté	general	(general	will)	of	the	people.”	So	populists	perennially	enter	into
conflicts	with	elites,	and	those	institutions	that	provide	checks	and	balances	between	different	parts	of	government.
In	Italy,	this	includes	the	office	of	the	president,	an	indirectly	elected	head	of	state	whose	powers	are	more	to
regulate	and	arbitrate	than	to	govern.
It	is	therefore	not	surprising	that	the	Lega	and	the	M5S	decided,	at	least	initially,	to	confront	Mattarella	rather	than
compromise.	If	new	elections	had	ensued,	Mattarella	would	have	served	as	the	perfect	metonym	for	an	entire	hated
elite.	His	choice	of	an	IMF	official	as	interim	premier,	one	associated	with	previous	austerity	programmes	in	Italy,	only
helped	the	populists’	cause	–	remember,	the	coalition’s	programme	was	a	deficit-financed	stimulus	with	expanded
welfare	spending.
The	meaning	of	Mattarella’s	decision
It	is	possible	that	Mattarella	did	not	intend	to	capsize	the	new	government;	after	all,	previous	premiers	have	accepted
the	presidential	veto.	Remember,	Mattarella	did	not	fire	Conte;	the	premier-designate	resigned.	Mattarella	got	his
way	in	the	end.
It	is	still	worth	paying	attention	to	the	reasons	Mattarella	cited	for	his	decision	to	block	the	appointment	of	Paolo
Savona.	Mattarella	stated	that,	“A	representative	[Savona]	who	…	may	not	be	seen	as	the	promoter	of	a	line	of
reasoning,	often	manifested,	that	could	probably,	or	even	inevitably,	provoke	Italy’s	exit	from	the	euro.”	The	president
also	cited	the	rising	interest	rates	demanded	for	Italian	public	debt;	losses	on	Italian	stock	markets;	and	concerns
about	the	integrity	of	Italians’	private	savings.	Mattarella	also	claimed	that	the	parties	had	not	campaigned	on
whether	to	leave	the	euro	in	the	preceding	electoral	campaign.	As	such,	naming	Savona	would	be	undemocratic.
Mattarella’s	statements	about	Savona	ignored	the	fact	that	the	coalition	agreement	–	the	text	binding	Savona,	Conte
and	both	parties	–	did	not	talk	about	leaving	the	euro.	There	was	talk	about	creating	an	exit	mechanism	in	early
drafts	of	the	agreement,	but	those	sections	were	removed.	Mattarella	was	almost	implying	that	Salvini	and	Di	Maio
had	a	secret	plan	to	leave	the	euro	–	or	perhaps,	he	interpreted	their	fiscal	plans	as	being	more	or	less	the	same
thing.
But	if	he	was	saying	that	coalition’s	programme	or	attitude	as	a	whole	was	unacceptable,	then	what	he	was	saying	is
that	he	might	not	appoint	a	government	whose	policies	would	a)	threaten	Italian	membership	of	the	Eurozone	and	b)
discomfit	the	financial	markets.	That	is	a	somewhat	shocking	statement	to	make.	One	could	argue	that	membership
in	the	Eurozone	and	its	fiscal	rules	are	part	of	the	Italian	constitutional	structure,	but	constitutions	and	treaties	can	be
amended.	Even	more	alarming	was	Mattarella’s	suggestion	that	he	wouldn’t	name	a	government	that	led	to
unwelcome	reactions	from	the	market,	or	even	contain	a	member	that	hints	at	radical	economic	policies.
That	sort	of	condition	would	severely	restrict	the	field	of	action	available	to	any	Italian	government,	and	implies,	as
Wolfgang	Streeck	argued,	that	the	markets	and	creditors	are	sovereign	and	not	the	electorate.	It	would	lock	in	an
almost	permanent	austerity,	given	Italy’s	high	debt	loads;	all	Italian	governments	would	effectively	be	confined	to
similar	fiscal	and	regulatory	policies.	It	is	precisely	this	sort	of	convergence	between	centre-left	and	centre-right
parties	that	fuels	populism	in	the	first	place,	since	it	justifies	the	narrative	that	“the	parties	are	all	the	same.”
What	happens	now?
The	irony	here	is	that,	by	blocking	the	government	formation	in	the	name	of	the	economic	status	quo,	Mattarella
risked	overturning	it	entirely.	He	all	but	invited	the	M5S	and	the	Lega	to	run	on	a	platform	of	Eurozone	exit	if	they
wished,	and	provided	the	perfect	environment	for	a	classic	populist	campaign	against	a	hated	elite	aligned	with
Europe.	By	accepting	Conte,	warts	and	all,	he	could	have	instead	hoped	for	a	quick	government	collapse	and	a
centrist	revival.
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Italian	parties	are	not	noted	for	their	strong	discipline.	The	M5S	lost	about	a	quarter	of	its	parliamentary	contingent	in
the	2013-18	parliament	due	to	defections	and	expulsions.	A	sizable	minority	of	the	party	is	much	more	liberal	than
the	Lega	or	the	coalition	agreement	on	immigration	and	other	issues.	The	Lega	also	suffered	large	scale	defections
and	expulsions	earlier	in	its	history	(it	lost	more	than	a	third	of	its	parliamentary	strength	in	the	1994-96	parliament,
the	first	time	it	served	in	government),	but	its	parliamentary	factions	have	tended	to	be	more	stable	in	recent
legislatures.
In	any	case,	the	Conte	government’s	first	test	comes	within	the	next	10	days,	when	it	must	win	a	vote	of	investiture	in
both	houses	of	the	Italian	Parliament.	The	coalition	has	majorities	in	each,	but	watch	this	space.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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